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Abstract 
 
Does the way scholars measure inequality of opportunity correspond to how people perceive 
it? To answer this question we must first clarify how scholars define and measure inequality 
of opportunity, we will then discuss the possible mechanisms link- ing objective measures 
and subjective perception of the phenomenon, and finally we test our hypothesis by merging 
data coming from two sources: the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (2011) and the International Social Survey Programme data (2009). We show that 
individual perception of unequal opportunity is heterogeneous across countries and among 
individuals. Moreover, the prevailing perception of the degree of unequal opportunity in a 
large sample of respondents is only weakly correlated with its objective measure. We estimate 
a multilevel model considering both individual and country level controls to explain 
individual perception of unequal opportunity. Our estimates suggest that one of the most 
adopted measure of in- equality of opportunity has no significant role in explaining its 
perception. Conversely, other country level variables and personal experiences of 
intergenerational social mobility are important determinants of how inequality of opportunity 
is perceived. 
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Introduction1 
 
Equality of opportunity is an increasingly considered topic in economics. In 2015 both the 
Handbook of Income Distribution (Atkinson & Bourguignon, 2015) and the Oxford Hand- 
book of Well-Being and Public Policy (Adler & Fleurbaey, 2015) devote more than one 
chapter to different aspects of equal opportunity. The way economists understand and mea- 
sure inequality of opportunity today is rooted on a debate involving political philosophers and 
theoretical economists about the egalitarian paradigm. Since the seminal contributions by 
Rawls in the early ’70s, a number of authors have attempted to revise the egalitarian paradigm 
proposing alternative spaces upon which equity should be implemented. Dworkin (1981a, b) 
suggested that the object of equalization should be individual resources endowment rather 
than achievements. Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989) explicitly introduced the idea of 
responsibility as a source of ethically inoffensive inequality. For all these authors the society 
should remove inequality arising from factors influencing individual’s outcome for which she 
cannot be held responsible (Ferreira & Peragine, 2015). Roemer (1998) proposed a definition 
of equal opportunity in which individuals exerting the same effort are entitled to obtain the 
same outcome and any inequality due to circumstances beyond individual control should be 
removed. 
More recently Fleurbaey (2008) introduced a framework in which preferences partici- pate 
together with resources to determine the level of individual welfare. If one agree that 
individuals can be held responsible for their preferences and choices this framework can be 
used to define and measure equality of opportunity. The most commonly proposed definitions 
of equality of opportunity are based on two norms: the principle of compensation, which 
states that inequality due to circumstances beyond individual control is inequality of 
opportunity, and the principle of reward, which states that inequality due to choice and effort 
is not. Different definitions of equality of opportunity originates from the way the two 
principles are balanced (Fleurbaey, 2008). In the recent years a vast range of definitions of 
equal opportunity, most of them have been translated into measures of inequality of 
opportunity, employed in a growing empirical literature. However, whether those definitions 
                                                     
1
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 2 
 
correspond to how people understand and perceive inequality of opportunity remains an 
unanswered question. 
A natural starting point for our investigation is the literature on the perception of in- equality, 
after all, inequality of opportunity is a particular type of inequality. The public opinion about 
the level of inequality in a country is relevant because it can influence individual behaviours. 
Perceived increasing inequality can modify electoral results or even trigger unrest, as it was 
suggested for Egypt and other countries involved in the Arab Spring (Verme, 2013). 
Nevertheless, very few authors have explicitly discussed the relationship between measured 
inequality and the general perception of inequality. According to Runcinam (1966) inequality 
is perceived and suffered as relative deprivation: individuals com- pare their outcome such as 
income, consumption or wealth, with the outcome of a reference group, their feeling of 
deprivation is an increasing function of the number of individuals having more than them. If 
this is the case, as shown by Yitzhaki (1979), the Gini index should correctly aggregate the 
total perceived deprivation. Therefore, we should expect a strong correlation between 
perceived inequality and inequality measured by the Gini index. However, a number of recent 
empirical contributions in psychology and economics have shown that the perception of 
inequality reported by people in opinions survey does not correspond to income inequality as 
it is commonly measured (Chambers et al., 2014; Cruces et al., 2013; Gimpelson & Treisman, 
2015; Nor- ton & Ariely, 2011; Verme, 2013). Other contributions have shown that a 
society’s structure can be perceived to be considerably less equitable than it really is 
(Niehues, 2014). Finally, Keller et al. (2010) comparing 27 European countries suggest that 
the correlation between measures of inequality and perception of inequality is stronger for 
measures of poverty than for measures of inequality. 
It is important to note, however, that the preponderance of the economic literature that has 
investigated this topic has not focused on the factors explaining the perception of in- equality. 
Perceived inequality has, instead, been generally considered to be an exogenous explanatory 
variable of the citiziens attitude toward redistribution. Beside the classical me- dian voter 
theory, in which the voters attitude is determined solely by their position in the income 
distribution, the “tunnel effect” theory - described by Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) - 
suggests a role for expectations: inequality in the short run can be positively perceived even 
by worse off individuals because it could be interpreted as a signal of future general 
improvement. Similarly the “prospect for upward mobility” hypothesis - theoretically 
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investigated by Benabou and Ok (2001) - suggests that when expecting upward mobility even 
individuals with an income below the median will oppose progressive redistributive policies. 
In discussing this mechanism these contributions have often introduced the idea that the 
degree of equal opportunity and social mobility is crucial in determining the acceptability of 
inequality. According to Piketty (1995) this idea date back to De Tocqueville (1835) who 
suggested that different rates of social mobility in the United States and Europe could ex- 
plain the differing attitudes toward redistribution. This point of view is shared by a number of 
authors that have explained different attitudes toward inequality in the two continents by 
reference to the difference in popular beliefs about the degree of social mobility (Lipset & 
Bendix, 1959; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina & Angeletos, 2005). A similar ex- 
planation has been proposed by Whyte (2010) and Lu (2012) in discussing the reaction to 
growing inequality in China, and also by Gimpelson & Monusova (2014) in relation to a large 
sample of countries. According to these theories, perceived inequality depends on the 
difference between what individuals feel entitled to obtain and what they have obtained, or 
expect to obtain in the future. 
Again, these contributions have considered the perception of equality of opportunity and 
social mobility owing to exogenous factors and have included them among the variables ex- 
plaining peoples attitudes toward inequality and redistributive policies. In what follows we 
endeavor to take a step back and seek instead to explain how the perception of equality of 
opportunity is formed and further, to explain the relationship between this perception and the 
actual degree of equality of opportunity in a given society. Very few sociological 
contributions have attempted to shed light on how the individual perception of social mobility 
is formed (Webb, 2000; Attias-Donfut and Wolff, 2001). Pasquier-Doumet (2005) represents 
the only contribution focusing on the perception of inequality of opportunity. Her analysis is 
based on a rich questionnaire of semi-open questions asked to a sample of 100 individuals in 
Lima. Unfortunately Pasquier-Doumet (2005) is a descriptive working paper, never 
published, which nevertheless contains a number of interesting research starting points. 
We will assume that for the public opinion the term equality of opportunity is un- ambiguous: 
inequality of opportunity is inequality due to circumstances beyond individual control, while 
inequality due to choice and effort is not. Under this assumption, how do individuals quantify 
the degree of equality of opportunity in their country? Are they able to quantify the effect of 
circumstances beyond individual control on the distribution of out- comes? 
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The simplest possible approach to answer this question is to impose a further assumption: that 
individuals are able to quantify the relative role of effort and circumstances in determining 
success in life. If this is so, we should expect a strong correlation between measured and 
perceived inequality of opportunity. Of course, individual perceptions may be imprecise 
because inequality of opportunity is a complex phenomenon. In order to formulate an opinion 
as to the degree of inequality one must first ascertain the average effect that choices and 
circumstances have on outcomes. Then, to judge the intensity of the phenomenon, one must 
compare inequality caused by circumstances in a particular country against some benchmark, 
for example by making a comparison with the same phenomenon in other countries. 
Individuals will inevitably make mistakes while undertaking this complicated process of 
reasoning. However, if the expected value of the error is zero and errors are not correlated 
within and between individuals, the distribution of perception among a large sample of 
individuals will be approximately normally distributed around the objective measure of 
inequality of opportunity. 
However, it must also be acknowledged that individual perceptions may be influenced by 
other factors and their aggregation may be less straightforward where this occurs. A case in 
point would be where a country’s institutional characteristics, for example, its fiscal system, 
affect public perception. In such cases we will find individuals perception to be downward 
biased or upward biased depending on the fiscal system in place in their country. Moreover, a 
plausible hypothesis is that perceptions of the relative importance of exogenous circumstances 
are shaped by personal experiences. Assuming that people can at least identify where they 
stand in respect of income distribution and their exogenous circumstances, we are left with 
the problem of understanding how individuals quantify the causal contribution of innate 
characteristics to this outcome. 
The economic literature is silent on this issue, but there is extensive literature in field of social 
psychology considering how individuals explain or attribute causes to outcomes. Since Fritz 
Heider’s seminal contributions, the attribution theory represents the main theoretical 
framework to explain the processes by which individuals attribute causes to events and 
behaviours (Weimer, 1974). According to this theory attribution can be internal, if people 
consider that an event is due to individual characteristics such as traits or feelings, or external 
if people consider the event occurs as a result of situational factors beyond individual control. 
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According to Weimer, attribution can also be classified by other two causal dimensions: 
stability and controllability. 
In this literature a number of empirical contributions have shown the presence of bias in the 
perceptual process, especially when individuals make causal inferences with regard to 
personal outcomes (Miller & Ross, 1975; Russell, 1982). According to these authors, a self- 
serving bias operates when individuals formulate attributions about the causes of personal 
successes and failures, distorting the cognitive process in order to maintain self-esteem. When 
explaining a success individuals tend to emphasise the role of internal causes. Causes of 
failures instead tend to be perceived as more external and uncontrollable. This point is 
particularly relevant for our analysis. When asked about the role of circumstances beyond 
individual control in determining success in life, interviewees may formulate a judgment 
based on experiences of success and failure familiar to them. In so doing, their own ex- 
perience may be disproportionately weighted. Therefore, owing to this self-esteem bias, we 
no longer expect the perception of inequality of opportunity to be distributed around its 
objective measure. On average, individuals who perceive their life as a story of success will 
tend to understate the role of external conditions in determining outcomes and by extension 
they will underestimate the degree of inequality of opportunity in their country. Conversely, 
individuals who perceive their life experiences to be failures will tend to overemphasise the 
importance of circumstances beyond individual control, that is to say that they will 
overestimate the degree of inequality of opportunity. 
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the concept of 
equality of opportunity and one of the most widely adopted approach to measure it. Section 2 
contains a description of the data and presents estimates for inequality of opportunity and its 
perception in 20 European countries. In Section 4 we empirically investigate two aspects of 
the inequality of opportunity perception: i) is the prevailing perception of inequality of 
opportunity in a given country close to its estimate? ii) What other factors influence the 
individual perception of the degree of equal of opportunity? Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Inequality of Opportunity 
A precise definition of what we mean when we talk about inequality of opportunity is a 
precondition for our analysis. Inequality of opportunity and social mobility have been at the 
centre of the research agenda in sociology and economics for at least four decades and a 
number of definitions, to a large extent overlapping, have been proposed in both disciplines. 
Recent economic literature addressing the measurement of inequality of opportunity has 
grown from early work by van de Gaer (1993) and Roemer (1998). As already mentioned a 
vast range of definitions and measures have been proposed and implemented in the last two 
decades, the most prominent theoretical definitions in the literature have been recently 
summarized by Ferreira & Peragine (2015) and Roemer & Trannoy (2015), a survey of the 
empirical approaches to measure inequality of opportunity can be found in Ramos & Van de 
gaer (2012), a meta analysis of the existing evidences is proposed by Brunori et al. (2013). 
In what follows we adopt the simple framework introduced by Checchi and Peragine (2010) 
to measure inequality of opportunity. 
The conceptual basis for the definition of inequality of opportunity is provided by the 
distinction between individual efforts and pre-determined circumstances. This approach 
considers that inequality due to the former is not ethically offensive, whereas it suggests that 
differences in individual outcome due to the latter represent a violation of the principle of 
equality of opportunity and should be removed. 
Equation (1) is the simplest possible model to study inequality of opportunity: individual 
desirable outcome (yi) is obtained as a function of two sets of traits: circumstances beyond 
individual control (c = c1,...,ck) and choice (e = e1,…,ej). 
yi = f(ck,ej)                                                                        (1) 
Inequality of opportunity is identified as the inequality owing to circumstances beyond 
individual control. In the literature, circumstances beyond individual control include all 
observable exogenous characteristics such as parental education, parental occupation, sex, and 
race. Because inequality due to choice or effort is generally unobservable it is obtained 
residually. To assess the degree of inequality of opportunity (the severity of the violation of 
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equality of opportunity) we need a meaningful decomposition of total inequality (I(y)) which 
will allow us to separate inequality due to circumstances (IOp(y)) and inequality due to effort 
(IOe(y)). 
Unfortunately, a clear distinction between the two components of inequality is generally 
impossible but in the very unlikely case of constant effect of circumstances on outcome for 
different effort levels. Whenever the unfair advantage of a circumstance is a function of the 
effort exerted it becomes impossible to distinguish the share of inequality due to opportunity 
from the residual inequality due to choice. This impossibility stems from the tension between 
the principle of compensation and the principle of reward and is well known in the literature 
on fair allocation (Fleurbaey, 1995; 2008) and on the measurement of unfair inequalities 
(Fleurbaey & Shockkaert, 2009; Fleurabey & Peragine, 2011). Due to this tension any 
measure of IOp can be fully consistent with one of the two principles but only partially 
satisfies the other. In what follows we adopt a decomposition of total inequality fully 
consistent with the principle of compensation which was proposed by Checchi and Peragine 
(2010) and has been adopted in the empirical literature. 
To obtain such a decomposition of total inequality we first partition the entire population into 
groups, called types, each type includes all individuals characterised by the same 
circumstances. For example, a hypothetical country characterised by two circumstances, sex 
and race, will be partitioned in four types: black men, black women, white men, white 
women. Then following Roemer (1998) we assume that effort (e) is orthogonal to 
circumstances (c), that is, any inequality correlated with circumstance is inequality due to 
opportunity. Under this assumption the degree of effort exerted by an individual can be 
measured as her position in the type specific distribution of outcome. Individuals sitting at the 
same quantile of the outcome distribution of different types are assumed to have exerted the 
same degree of effort. For example, a black woman sitting at the top decile of her type 
specific income distribution is considered to be exerting the same degree of effort of a white 
man in the richest 10% of his type specific income distribution. Our original distribution of 
income is now twice partitioned: in types (individuals affected by different circumstances) 
and in quantiles (made of individuals that exerted same degree of effort). We can now 
measure IOp as inequality between types and IOe as inequality between quantiles. To obtain 
this decomposition there are a number of methods which unfortunately lead to different IOp 
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estimates (Fleurbaey, 2008; Ferreira & Peragine, 2015). Again, here we follow the popular 
approach proposed by Checchi & Peragine (2010). 
We consider inequality between quantiles as legitimate because this is due to effort whereas 
inequality within quantiles to be inequality of opportunity. Therefore we modify the original 
distribution of incomes: we first replace the individuals’ income of those sharing same 
circumstances and same degree of effort with their mean income of (μk
j
), then we divide 
types’ mean by the mean of their quantile (μj) multiplied by the populations average income 
(μ). This transformation removes all inequality between quantiles (and within types) and 
leaves intact inequality within quantiles. Inequality in this counterfactual distribution is 
therefore IOp and the remaining is IOe.  
 
IOp = I [ (μk
j 
/μj ) μ ] = I(yc)                                                       (2) 
However, not all circumstances are observable therefore, IOp is interpreted as a lower bound 
estimate of inequality due to opportunity in the distribution of y. For our purpose this measure 
of IOp has two important features: it is a largely adopted in the relevant literature and has an 
intuitive meaning. The second property is crucial in this context because we aim to precisely 
compare measures and perceptions of the phenomenon. More sophisticated measures of 
inequality of opportunity may be much more distant from the intuitive meaning of the term
2
. 
 
3. Inequality of opportunity and perceived inequality of oppor- tunity in 22 European 
countries 
In what follows we will empirically investigate these two issues: i) is the prevailing 
perception of inequality of opportunity in a given country close to IOp estimate? ii) What 
other factors influence the individual perception of the degree of equal of opportunity? To 
achieve an answer we first measure IOp in a sample of countries and we compare these 
estimates with the prevailing perception of the phenomenon in the public opinion. We then 
                                                     
2 For example, as shown by Brunori and Peragine (2011), the compensation-consistent measure proposed by Checchi and 
Peragine (2010) is virtually never consistent with the principle of reward. One therefore may consider a measure such as 
the fairness gap introduced by Fleurebaey and Schokkaert (2009) a preferable measure of IOp because it has the property 
of being also consistent with the reward principle for a reference circumstance. However, we consider the measure 
proposed by Checchi and Peragine more intuitive because of its reference to averages 
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investigate what factors distort the individual perception of IOp estimating a regression model 
which includes a number of country level and individual level controls. 
The data requirements for studying the relationship between IOp and its perception are rather 
demanding. One requires both information on public opinion and a precise record of incomes 
and individual circumstances. These two types of information are rarely contained in a unique 
dataset. We therefore merge information from two sources: the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP 2009) and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC 2011). Although the first survey contains opinions recorded in 2009 and the 
second contains incomes earned in 2010, we consider the two surveys as if they were 
conducted simultaneously. This small asynchrony may be ignored because the phenomena we 
are dealing with are measured and judged in a time horizon of two generations. Conversely, 
the fact that ISSP was conducted in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis (2007-08) is a 
potential threat for the external validity of our analysis. It may be possible that individual 
perceptions have been modified after a shock that has reduced expectations for future growth 
at least in the richest economies. 
Given the large overlap of the two samples we are able to study a subsample of 20 European 
countries included both in EU-SILC 2011 and ISSP 2009: Austria (AT), Bel- gium (BE), 
Bulgaria (BG), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland 
(FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LT), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), 
Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United 
Kingdom (UK). 
To identify the determinants of IOp perception we use opinions recorded in the ISSP 2009. 
ISSP 2009 contains information about how social mobility and equality of opportunity are 
experienced and perceived together with a number of individual level covariates. Descriptive 
statistics of the average values of respondents characteristics in the 20 samples are reported in 
Table 1. 
The data needed to measure IOp is a representative survey of individuals containing in- 
formation about: income, socioeconomic background, country of origin and possibly all the 
other circumstances beyond individual control that play a role in determining income. 
Although ISSP 2009 contains all these variables, because its sampling strategy is constructed 
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to correctly represent opinions it cannot be considered sufficiently reliable to estimate other 
phenomena such as the income distribution. 
 
Table 1: ISSP descriptive statistics 
 
Source: Author’ calculation based on ISSP, 2009. Descriptive statistics are calculated using 
sample weights where available. 
In particular, comparing the household income variable - the outcome of interest in this 
analysis - with official estimates we have found systematic inconsistencies. We therefore 
estimate IOp for the sample of European countries exploiting the Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions, (EU-SILC). EU-SILC is a reliable source for the analysis of the income 
distribution. Moreover, it has been already utilised by a number of authors in the study of 
equality of opportunity. The wave collected in 2010 contains a module about 
intergenerational transmission of disadvantages which includes information about 
socioeconomic background. We follow other contributions by limiting our analysis to a 
subsample of respondents: working age adult individuals aged between 25 and 65 (Marrero & 
Rodrguez, 2012; Checchi et al, 2015). We implement a non-parametric approach to estimate 
IOp, this identifying groups of individuals sharing same circumstances and then partitioning 
each group into three income quantiles. This procedure is demanding in term of sample size 
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and forces us to consider only three circumstances beyond individual control: parental 
education, parental occupation and gender, Table 6 in the Appendix re- ports the distribution 
of circumstances across countries. IOp is then calculated as the mean logarithmic deviation 
applied to the counterfactual distribution (y
c
) where the outcome y is the household income 
divided by the square root of the number of household components
3
. Other contributions 
identify individual outcome with earnings or - especially in poorer countries - with per capita 
consumption, we prefer to use equivalent income which allows us to include in the analysis 
all individuals without individual earnings which nevertheless benefit from a positive income. 
Table 2 reports the sample size, mean income, total inequality, and IOp (both in levels and as 
share of total inequality).  
Table 2: EU-SILC descriptive statistics 
 
Source: Author’ calculation based on EU-SILC (2011) and Eurostat (2015). Equivalent 
income and GDP per capita are expressed in euro PPP ESA 2010. Average equivalent 
income and total inequality (Gini) are calculated on the entire sample, IOp is calculated on 
the subsample made of working age individuals. 
 
                                                     
3 Although other inequality measures, such as the Gini, are used to measure IOp, the mean logarithmic deviation has been 
traditionally adopted because of its perfect and path independent decomposability into between and within groups 
(Checchi and Pragine, 2010). 
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IOp varies between 0.0008 (0.53% of total inequality) in Denmark and 0.0330 (16.04%) in 
Bulgaria. The last two columns in Table 2 reports per capita GDP and average per capita GDP 
growth rate in the 1999-2009 decade. Our estimates in Figure 1 show the well known positive 
relationship between total inequality and inequality of opportunity (Corak, 2013) and a lower 
level of equality of opportunity for Mediterranean and transition economies. 
Figure 1: Inequality and relative IOp 
 
Source: EU-SILC (2011). Inequality of opportunity is the share of total inequality due to 
exogenous variables (IOp in eq. 2). 
 
 
3.1 Perception of inequality of opportunity 
Equality of opportunity combines two principles: the principle of compensation and the 
principle of reward. According to the principle of compensation, inequality is unfair when 
arises from circumstances beyond individual control e. g. socioeconomic background, gender, 
race. The principle of reward states that whenever inequality is the result of choices and effort 
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it is legitimate. The combination of these two principles is the theory of equal opportunity 
(see Fleurbaey (2008) for a discussion). In the absence of a survey question such as “what is 
the degree of equal opportunity in your country?” we combine the answer to a number of 
questions that we believe capture the perception of the phenomenon. From the ISSP questions 
about the importance of different individual characteristics for getting ahead in life we select 
the following: 
1. coming from a wealthy family?  
2. knowing the right people? 
3. a person’s race? 
4. a person’s religion? 
5. being born a man or a woman?  
6. having ambition?  
7. hard work? 
Possible answers are: 1=essential, 2=very important, 3=fairly important, 4=not very 
important, 5=not at all important. 
The first five questions measure the perceived violation of the principle of compensation: if 
the respondent identifies family wealth, religion, race, or gender, as important characteristics 
for success in life then the degree of equal opportunity she perceives is low. The latter two 
questions measure to what extent the principle of reward is perceived to be satisfied: the more 
hard work and ambition are considered important determinants of success the higher the 
degree of perceived equal opportunity. Table 3 reports the share of respondents that 
considered each determinant at least very important to get ahead in life. The picture we get is 
very heterogeneous and contains a number of interesting outliers. A low number of 
respondents consider family wealth to be at least very important, in transition economies 
(21% in Bulgaria and Poland) while the highest percentage is interestingly found in Fin- land, 
the country with the third lowest IOp in our sample. Connections are considered at least very 
important by almost 40% of the French interviewees but by less than 6% of the Polish and 
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Slovak respondents. Race is considered to be at least very important by over the 70% of the 
Estonian and 78% of the Latvian respondents
4
.  
Table 3: Determinants to get ahead in life: share of respondents answering ‘essential’ or ‘very 
important’. 
 
Source: Author’ calculation based on ISSP, 2009. Share of answers are obtained using 
sample weights when available. Possible answers: 1=essential, 2=very important, 3=fairly 
important, 4=not very important, 5=not at all important. 
Race is apparently perceived to be less important in Hungary (40%). Religion appears as an 
important determinant of success again in Latvia (89%) and Estonia (88%)
5
. Estonia has also 
the highest percentage of respondents considering gender essential or very important to 
success in life (77%). As far as the questions regarding the reward principle are concerned 
Estonia again signals a high degree of perceived IOp with only the 46% of the respondents 
                                                     
4 This may be connected to the problem of access to the labour market for non-native speakers (mainly Russian) more than 
with the issue of race per se. 
5 Also in this case the religious cleavage overlaps with ethnicity with a minority of Russian-speaking Orthodox followers in 
both countries. 
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considering ambition at least very important, the highest percentage is found in Poland (91%). 
Finally, hard work is viewed as an essential element of success in Cyprus and Poland (88% 
and 85%) while, at the opposite end of the scale is Denmark with only the 41% of 
respondents convinced of its importance. Table 3 shows a large heterogeneity both in the 
absolute importance and the ranking of different sources of inequality. Religion is on average 
considered the main source of unequal opportunity, ambition and hard work are also 
perceived as important factors to succeed in life. Knowing the right people is on average 
perceived to be the least important of the variables considered.  
Even though each answer may be considered a good proxy for the perception of IOp, the 
weak correlation of the answers distribution across dimensions suggests that we must include 
all those factors in an aggregated index in order to consistently compare IOp as it is measured 
and as it is perceived across countries
6
. As shown in Table 3 the channels of transmission of 
unfair inequality greatly differ from country to country. 
Moreover, we are interested in a measure of IOp perception that is sensitive to violations of 
both the principle compensation and the principle of reward. Indeed, one can imagine a 
society in which hard work plays a clear role in determining individual success, that is also a 
society in which the extent of what one can attain is strongly influenced by socioeconomic 
background (the principle of reward is satisfied but the principle of compensation is not). 
Similarly, it could be that family wealth has no role in determining success in life but 
nevertheless the effort one exerts plays no role in determining your success in life, because, 
for example individual achievements are entirely determined by luck or other random factors 
(the principle of compensation is satisfied but the principle of reward is violated). 
To explore the link between perception and measured IOp we aggregate the seven 
components in a scalar measure of IOp perception. As we are dealing with ordinal variables 
we propose a simple index which both aggregates the seven dimensions and preserves the 
ordinal nature of the answers. We first make the five questions about compensation consistent 
with the other two, that is we recode them so that 1=“not at all important” and 5=“essential”. 
Individual perception is then determined as the median of the seven answers. In the resultant 
index of Inequality of Opportunity Perception, IOpP, ranges between one and five. IOpP 
                                                     
6 Table 7 in the Appendix reports correlations between the fraction of answers in Table 3 for each pair of components. The 
correlations have the expected signs but are on average rather weak. 
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assumes value one when at least four of the seven factors violating the principle of equal 
opportunity are judged as “not at all important” and it assumes value five when at least three 
of the seven violations are perceived as essential. In order to get a sense of how this would 
operate imagine to ask to someone to rank the sources of unfair inequality from the least 
important to the most important, pick the median (4th) and ask her how important is that 
particular source of inequality of opportunity from 1=“not at all important” to 5=“essential”. 
The answer is her individual IOpP . 
IOpP has some undesirable limitations: it arbitrarily assigns the same weight to each 
component and - being based on the median of a small sample - may be not the best measure 
of central tendency. On the other hand, IOpP has the important property of not imposing a 
cardinal meaning to an ordinal scale. This property will be exploited when assessing the 
determinants of the individual perception of inequality of opportunity, it is however not 
preserved when we calculate the average perception in each country. 
4 Estimates 
Figure 2 reports perceived and measured IOp in the 20 European countries. The top 
scatterplot presents both IOp and IOpP in absolute terms. The correlation is very weak and 
not statistically significant. Although, it should be noted that an increase in IOp is associated 
with a slightly increase in IOpP, many countries with a similar degree of equality of 
opportunity show very different perceptions of the phenomenon. Belgium and United 
Kingdom have very similar IOp values but are found at the two extremes in terms of 
perception. Similarly Bulgaria has four time the IOp of Switzerland but very similar average 
perception. However, it may be much easier for respondents to assess the relative position of 
their own countries in terms of IOp rather than the absolute intensity of the phenomenon the 
bottom scatterplot reports the same correlation looking at the rank of countries. Again average 
perception is very far from the actual ranking of countries based on the IOp measure. With 
some countries extremely far from what is expected (the 45 degree line). Such descriptive 
figures suggest that how individuals perceive IOp very weakly correlates with how scholars 
measure it. Note also that this conclusion is not driven by the way we have aggregated the 
seven answers. In the Appendix Figure 4 reports the scatterplots for the rankings of each one 
of the seven questions separately: all scatterplots show an even lower level of associ- ation 
between IOp and its perception. In the last case, the question about hard work, the correlation 
of ranks has the unexpected negative sign. 
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Figure 2: Inequality of opportunity: measure and perception 
 
 
Source: ISSP (2009) & EU-SILC (2011). Inequality of opportunity is the share of total 
inequality due to exogenous variables (IOp in eq. 2). Attitude toward inequality is the average 
IOpP index in each country. 
This descriptive figures show that individuals’ perceptions do not amount to an unbiased 
average perception of IOp. We have suggested that IOpP may differ from IOp because in 
quantifying the role of circumstances on successes and failures individuals may tend to 
weight their own experience too heavily. If this is the case their evaluation of IOp may be 
distorted by a self-esteem bias. In what follows we specify a model able to identify a number 
of determinants of the individual IOp perception. Because we have aggregated the seven 
answers, preserving their ordinal nature, IOpP is a multichotomous dependent variable. For 
individual i in country j we assume that there is a latent continuous metric underlying the 
ordinal answer to the median of the seven questions (y
∗
i,j). We assume also that the latent 
variable is a linear combination of a number of independent determinants at individual levels 
(x), a set of cutpoints (μ), and an unobserved individual effect ε assumed normally distributed 
across observations. 
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y
*
i,j =x′ β+εi,j                                                      (3) 
Inequality of opportunity varies across countries, it is therefore safe to assume a component of 
the individual effect is shared by respondents from the same country. If this is the case εi, j 
should be written as the sum of an individual and a country unobservable effect: 
y
*
i,j =x′ β+νj+εi,j                                                    (4) 
νj can be a fixed effect or can be influenced by a number of country level variables, in the 
latter case can be written as a function of a set of country level variables (z) and an 
unobserved country specific effect (u). 
 y
*
i,j =x′i,j β+zj′γ+uj+εi,j                                                  (5) 
y
∗
 is not observable, what we observe is: 
                                                yi,j = not at all important if y
*
i,j < μ1  
yi,j = not very important if μ1 <  y
*
i,j ≤ μ2                                                   (6) 
                                                ...  
                                                 yi,j = essential if   y
*
i,j > μ4  
If the mean and variance for ε are normalised to be zero and one and assumed independent of 
uj we get: 
Prob( yi,j = not at all important |x, z) = H(μ1 − yi,j)                                   
Prob(yi,j = not very important |x, z) = H(μ2 − yi,j) − H(μ1 − yi,j)             (7) 
… 
Prob(yi,j = essential |x, z) = 1 − H(μ4 − yi,j) 
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Where yi,j can be specified according to equations (3), (4) or (5) and H(.) is the logistic 
cumulative distribution function. These probabilities and the degree of association with some 
explanatory variables can be estimated by maximum likelihood with an ordered logit 
regression model (Green, 2003; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012). We specify three versions 
of the ordered logistic model. (3) A pooled model with corrections of the standard error to 
account for data clustered in 20 countries, (4) a pooled model with country fixed effects, (5) a 
mixed two level model. The latter is a two-level model in which individuals are nested in 
countries. For the first two models we include among regressors individual controls: the age 
of the respondent, her sex, her education (whether she at least completed upper secondary 
level education or not), her employment status (worker, unemployed, retired), if she is in 
education, and its area of residency (urban vs. rural). Moreover, in order to test for the 
presence of a self-esteem bias we add two dummy variables: downward mobility and upward 
mobility. The former takes value one if the respondent considers the job qualification she has 
today lower than the job qualification that her father had when she was between 14 and 16 
years of age. The latter takes value one if the respondent considers her job qualification 
higher
7
. The mixed model includes also country level regressors. Because the inclusion of 
many cluster level controls has been shown to be problematic for similar numbers of clusters 
(Bryan & Jankins, 2015) we limit the number of country level controls to three: IOp in 2010, 
GDP per capita in PPP, and the GDP per capita growth in the 1999-2009 decade. Table 4 
contains the coefficients for the three specifications of the model. 
Estimates are consistent across specifications however, the likelihood-ratio test (χ2 = 
428.66Prob > χ2 = 0.0000) suggests that there is enough variability between countries to 
prefer a multilevel ordered logistic model over a standard ordered logistic model. We 
therefore focus on the interpretation of model (5). 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 Note that we are assuming that individuals are able to assess their level of qualification relatively to their parents which is 
not necessarily always the case (Webb, 2000). 
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Table 4: Individual IOp percetpion: ordered logit estimates 
 
Source: Author’ calculation based on ISSP, 2009; EU-SILC, 2011, Eurostat, 2015. 
We first assess whether the categories constructed aggregating the seven answer are 
distinguishable categories for the respondents looking at the cutpoints (μ1, ..., μ4) confidence 
intervals. Categories with overlapping confidence intervals in an ordinal model are interpreted 
as signaling that ordinal categories are undistinguishable and would suggest to col- lapse 
those categories. However, in our case the values of the perception variable seem to be 
perceived as well distinguished by individuals. Threshold parameters are significantly 
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different at a 95% level of confidence. Indeed, thresholds are equally spread out suggesting 
that the categories we have constructed do not differ much in scope. 
The interpretation of the coefficients varies depending on the category considered. An 
increase in one of the regressor with a positive coefficient is equivalent to shifting the 
distribution to the right. This shift has an unambiguous consequence on the first and last 
categories (minimum and maximum perceived level of IOp) because it shifts some mass out 
of the first interval [−∞, μ1] and toward the last interval [μ4, ∞]. Therefore to be older or 
unemployed reduces the probability of having the lowest possible perception of IOp. By 
contrast students have a higher probability of choosing a combination of answers leading to 
the minimum IOpP. Urban residency, a variable often included as a proxy for reference group 
in models of relative deprivation, significantly increases the degree of inequality of 
opportunity perceived. The self-esteem hypothesis is confirmed for the lowest and highest 
category by the highly significant coefficients for the downward and upward mobility 
variables. As far as country variables are concerned GDP per capita and GDP growth increase 
the probability to have the lowest possible perception of IOp. Interestingly enough the 
objective measure of IOp seems to have no impact in the perception of IOp itself. However, 
these interpretations cannot be extended to the three middle categories because the shift of the 
distribution implies that some mass will move into each of the middle categories but some 
will also move out. 
To evaluate the effect of our control across all the IOpP categories we report the marginal 
effects for all categories and all variables in Table 5. 
As expected the marginal effects for the first category have the opposite sign of the 
coefficients. A positive coefficient indicates that an increase in the regressor reduces the 
probability of the lowest category, this implies a negative marginal effect for the probability 
to be in the first category (IOpP = 1). Age, unemployment status, urban residency, and having 
experienced downward mobility reduce the probability of having a low perception of IOp. 
Conversely, respondents who are in education and have experienced upward mobility are 
more likely to perceive a low level of IOp. Country level controls Marginal effects for the 
probability of being in the second category, where we find the majority of respondents, have 
all the same signs but are lower in terms of magnitude. 
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Table 5: Individual IOp percetpion: ordered logit marginal effects calculated for model (5) 
 
Source: Author’ calculation based on ISSP, 2009; EU-SILC, 2011, Eurostat, 2015. 
For example, being a downward mover instead of an upward mover reduces the probability of 
being in the first category by 3%, this difference is reduced to slightly more than 2% in the 
second category. All the statistical significant marginal effects have the opposite sign for the 
three highest categories. The country level controls show that, after controlling for all the 
other observable covariates, GDP per capita and GDP growth in the last decade affect IOpP: 
the perception of inequality of opportunity decreases in richer and more dynamic countries. 
However, as already shown in Table 4, the most interesting result is that the measure of IOp 
included among controls does have the expected effect on its perception (reduces the 
probability to be in the first categories) but this effect is not statistically significant. 
Although we are reluctant to conclude that the way economists measure inequality of 
opportunity has nothing to do with the way it is perceived by people, this estimates suggest 
that the other country characteristics and individual variables play a much clearer role in 
determining IOp perception. 
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Finally, in Figure 3 we report for each category the 95% confidence interval for predicted odd 
ratios of the two type of respondents: upward movers and downward movers. Although the 
precision of the estimates is very different for the two groups (upward movers are about twice 
as many as downward movers) the distribution of the odd ratios across categories show that, 
other things held constant, the experience of intergenerational mobility significantly modifies 
the perception of IOp. 
Figure 3: Perception of IOp for upward and downward movers 
 
Source: ISSP(2009) and EU-SILC (2011). Intervals correspond to 95% confidence intervals. 
IOpP is constructed aggregating information about seven questions but none of them 
explicitly refers to occupational mobility. Moreover, questions about personal experiences of 
social mobility are unlikely to have framed these answers because they are asked later in the 
questionnaire. Aware that the controls available are limited, leaving a large part of IOpP 
variability unexplained or explained by country fixed effect, we interpret our results as 
evidence of the role of individual experience in biasing IOp perception. 
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5. Conclusions 
The perception of economic phenomena such as growth, inequality and discrimination can 
have a large impact on the believes and choices of individuals. Investment choices, electoral 
behaviour, reproductive decisions may be based on perceived phenomena rather then on 
objective measure of them. When the Arab Spring spread throughout the majority of the Arab 
countries in 2010 many commentators suggested that protests were triggered by increasing 
inequality. However, there exist no clear evidence of increasing income inequality in those 
countries in the preceding years. Nevertheless, perceived inequality have been growing and 
may be among the causes of one of the most important revolutionary wave of the last decades. 
Political scientists, sociologists and economists are aware of the role of perceptions. Believes 
ad perceptions are often included among explanatory variables in the analysis of individual or 
collective behaviours. However, perceptions are often considered exogenous variables and the 
analysis of how they are formed is rarely the focus of these studies. 
This paper is the first attempt to empirically explain the individuals perception of in- equality 
of economic opportunity. There are many possible definitions of equal opportunity ranging 
from definitions prescribing that outcomes should be allocated according to talent and merit, 
to fully egalitarian interpretations of the same principle. However, the vast majority of these 
definition distinguish between fair and unfair source of inequality and list among the latter 
circumstances beyond individual control such as: race, gender or socioeconomic background. 
We adopted one of the most popular definition and we estimated a widely used measure of 
inequality of opportunity in a sample of 20 European countries. For the same countries we 
construct an individual ordinal measure of perceived unequal opportunities and merging the 
two measures we show a weak correlation between prevailing perceived inequality of 
opportunity and objective measures of the same phenomenon. A weak correlation is found 
both looking at the absolute perception and at the ranking of countries. Among possible 
models to explain the individual perception of the phenomenon we opted for a a mixed or- 
dinal logit model. Together with a country random effect, two of the three country level 
explanatory variables included, GDP per capita and economic growth, are shown to explain a 
significant share of the total perception variability. In richer and more dynamic countries the 
perceived inequality of opportunity is lower. Conversely our model suggests that, after 
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controlling for all the other variables, the estimated inequality of opportunity does not play a 
significant role in determining its perception. Further, we found a number of individual 
characteristics to have an impact on the degree of perceived inequality of opportunity. Among 
them, unemployment and experiencing downward intergenerational mobility significantly 
increase the probability of a person perceiving a lower degree of equal opportunity in her 
country. We interpret these relationships as signals of the existence of a self-esteem bias in 
the cognitive process of how people view equality of opportunity: respondents that have good 
reasons to perceive their experience in the labour market as a failure systematically 
overemphasise the role of external causes in determining socioeconomic success. 
Our results suggest that the popular perception of inequality of opportunity may be very 
weakly linked to objective measures of the same phenomenon produced by scholars. 
Conversely, other country characteristics - such as wealth and growth - together with 
individual experiences play a determining role in shaping our perception of complex 
phenomena such as inequality of opportunity. These findings suggest an interesting direction 
for future research; is it possible to construct an index of relative IOp obtained by aggregating 
individual perceptions? Can Yitzhak’s approach to relative deprivation be transferred to 
inequality of opportunity? 
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Appendix  
The measure of inequality of opportunity is obtained partitioning the population into 16 types 
based on three circumstances: sex, parental education, and parental occupation. Parental 
occupation is coded into two groups: higher when at least one parent completed upper 
secondary, and lower otherwise. Parental occupation status is based on the highest ISCO 88 
occupation status of the parents, grouped into three categories: highly skilled non-manual 
(ISCO codes 11-34), lower-skilled non-manual (41-52), skilled manual (61-83) and 
elementary occupation (91-93). 
Table 6: EU-SILC descriptive statistics 
 
Source: Author’ calculation based on EU-SILC (2011) 
 
Table 7: Answers correlation across IOpP components 
 
 
Source: Author’ calculation based on ISSP, 2009. 
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Figure 4: Inequality of opportunity components: measure and perception (ranks) 
 
 
 
Source: ISSP (2009) & EU-SILC (2011). Inequality of opportunity is inequality due to 
exogenous variables (IOp in eq. 2). Perception is the average answer to the seven questions 
considered. 
 
 
 
